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1. On the construction of the Will of Stephen Girard, the word "orphan," held tomean afatheres child, and not necessarily one who has lost both parents,
2. The preference directed by the testator to be given to orphans born in the "City
of Philadelphia," among applicants for admission to the College to be established.
under his Will, applies to the city as it was laid out by William Penn, and exis-

ted at the death of the testator, and not as it was subsequently increased in
territorial limit.

This was an appeal from the Court of Nisi Prius. The opinion
of the court was delivered by
J.-William Penn contemplated, before leaving England
for America, laying out a certain quantity of land or ground plat,
for a large town or city, in the most convenient place upon the river
for health and navigation. In his celebrated letter to the committee
of the Free Society of Traders of the Province, residing in London,
-written in T683, he describes his city in the following language:
"Philadelphia, the expectation of those that are concerned in this
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Province, is at last laid out, to the great content of those here, that
are any ways interested therein. The situation is a neck of land,
and lieth between two navigable rivers, Delaware and Schulkill,
whereby it hath two fronts on the water, each a mile, and two from
river to river. Delaware is a glorous river; but Schulkill being a
hundred miles boatable above the falls, and its course northeast,
towards the fountain of Susquehanna, that leads to the heart of
the Province, and both sides our own, it is like to be a great part of
the settlement of this age. I say little of the town itself, because
a platform will be shown you, by my agent, in which those who are
purchasers of me, will find their names and interests."
In a short advertisement upon the situation and extent of the city
of Philadelphia, and the platform thereof, by the Surveyor General,
Thomas Holme, he says: "The city of Philadelphia now extends
from river to river two miles, and in breadth near a mile; and the
Governor, as a further manifestation of his kindness unto the purchasers hath freely given them their respective lots in the city,
without defalcation of any of their quantities of purchased lands;
and as it is now placed and modelled between two rivers, upon a neck
of land, and that ships may ride in good anchorage, in six or eight
fathoms water, in both close to the city, and the land of the city, level,
dry, and wholesome, such a situation is scarce to be paralleled."
Throughout the whole of this document, it is spoken of as the
city, and in mentioning the public squares, he uses this language,
"there are also in each quarter of the city, a square of eight
acres, to be for the like uses as the Moorfields are in London."
"The air," says the proprietary, "is sweet and clear, the heavens'
serene, like the south parts of France, rarely overcast, and as the
woods come by numbers of people to be more cleared, that itself
will refine."
In the same year, 1683, that the city was laid out by the proprietary, it is called in the heading to the laws made at an assembly,
-held at Philadelphia, on the 27th day of the eighth month, "The
city of Philadelphia," and in various acts, up to the year 1701,
inclusive, "The town of Philadelphia." 1 Hall & Sellbrs, p. 19.
On the 25th October, 1701, the proprietary granted a charter to
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the city of Philadelphia, in which he said, "that at the humble
request of the inhabitants and settlers of this town of Philadelphia,
being some of the first adventurers and purchasers within this Province, for their encouragement, and for the more immediate and
entire government of the said town, and better regulation of trade
therein, I have, by virtue of the King's letters patent, under the great
seal of England, erected the said town into a borough, and by these
presents do erect the said town and borough of Philadelphia into a
city, which said city shall extend the limits and bounds, as it is laid
out between Delaware and Schuylkill ;" and its corporate title was
the "Mayor and Commonalty of the City of Philadelphia."
By the Revolution, according to the expressive language of the
legislature of 1777, all powers and jurisdictions not founded on the
authority of the people only, became null and void, and the corporation of the city was therefore dissolved and all its powers and
jurisdictions entirely ceased. The affairs of the city were managed by various local bodies, until the passage of the act to
incorporate the city of Philadelphia, on the 11th of March 1789,
by which it was enacted that "the inhabitants of the city of Philadelphia as the same extends and is laid out between the rivers
Delaware and Schuylkill, be and they and their successors forever
are hereby constituted a corporation and body politic in fact and in
law, by the name and style of the "The Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Philadelphia," and so they continued until their consolidation with the rest of the county of Philadelphia into one great city,
under the act of the 2d February, 1854.
On the 28th of April, 1794, the district of Southwark was incorporated by the name of "The Commissioners and Inhabitants of the
District of Southwark ;" on the 28th March, 1803, the district of the
Northern Liberties was incorporated; on the 12th March, 1812,
the township of Moyamensing; on the 22d March, 1813, the district
of Spring Garden; and on the 6th of March, 1820, the Kensington
District was incorporated.
The city of Philadelphia, in 1744, contained 1,500 houses, and
13,000 people; in 1790, 28,552; in 1800, 41,220 ; in 1810, 53,722;
in 1820, 63,802 inhabitants, whilst the rest of the county of Phila-
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delphia, from 1800 to 1820, numbered about as many as the city
proper. In 1830 the population of the city was 80,458; of the
surrounding incorporated districts above enumerated 80,952 ; and of
the rural districts of the county 27,451.
The city of London, like the city of Philadelphia, is surrounded
by other municipal communities entirely distinct from it, as to revenue, expenditures, and local administration, and whilst the whole
metropolis in 1841 covered a surface of 10,000 acres, -ith a population of nearly two millions, its territory is limited to about one square
mile, or 600 acres, and its population to 129,251 souls. The corporate and parochial income of the city of London for public objects,
and derived from trust estates for the relief of the poor, care of the
sick, education, religion, and general purposes, local rates, coal and
metage duties, street and market tolls, freedom and livery fines, and
other charges for corporate and trading privileges, the port of London, and the conservancy of the river is estimated to amount to the
annual sum of £900,000 sterling, or four millions five hundred
thousand dollars.
Stephen Girard was born in Bordeaux, in France, on the 21st
day of May, 1750. His father was a sea captain, and at the age
of fourteen, young Girard became a sailor, and made several voyages
to the Vest Indies. On the 4th of October, 1773, after undergoing
the necessary examination, a license was duly granted, giving to
Stephen Girard, of Bordeaux, full authority to act as captain, master, and patron of a merchant vessel.
Having purchased goods to the value of nearly 16,000 livres, or
about $3,000 in federal money, Mr. Girard started on his first
mercantile adventure, and sailed again from his home, (which he
never afterwards revisited,) arriving at St. Marc's, in the island of
St. Domingo, in the month of February, 1774. After disposing of
his venture, and converting the proceeds into produce, he left the
West Indies and arrived for the first time in the North American
colonies, at the port of New York, in the month of July of the same
year. For several years, first as mate, and subsequently as master
and part owner of a small vessel and cargo, he traded between New
York, New Orleans, and Port au Prince, and in May, 1777, in the
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latter capacity, Mr. Girard entered the waters of the Delaware, and
arrived for the first time at Philadelphia, where he commenced business and rented a store in Water street, within a short distance of
the spot where he located himself permanently.
On the approach of the British troops, he left for Mount Holly, in
New Jersey, where he purchased a small property, and after the
evacuation of Philadelphia by the enemy, on the 17th of June,
1778, he again returned and resumed his business in Water street.
In this neighborhood, with the exception of a voyage to Charlest6n and the Mediterranean, in a brig owned and commanded by
himself, and which terminated in July, 1788, Stephen Girard lived
and died a citizen of the city of Philadelphia.
In the great yellow fever of 1793, which broke out in Water
street, within a square of his residence, Mr. Girard distinguished
himself by visiting and attending upon the sick, and by his invaluable services as an active manager of the Hospital at Bush Hill.
Seventeen thousand persons left the city, and of the remainder
upwards of four thousand, or nearly a fifth, died. At a meeting of
the citizens of Philadelphia, the Northern Liberties, and District of
Southwark, assembled on Saturday, the 22d day of March, 1794,
and presided over by Thomas McKean, a signer of the Declaration
of Independence, and then Chief Justice, and afterwards Governor
of the State, their most cordial, grateful, and fraternal thanks were
presented to those fellow-citizens named in the proceedings "for
their benevolent and patriotic exertions in relieving the miseries of
suffering humanity on the late occasion." One of these citizens thus
gratefully remembered was Stephen Girard, under whose "*meritorious exertions and peculair care" at the Bush Hill Hospital, in
conjunction with Peter Helm, "every possible comfort was provided for the sick, and decent burial for those whom their efforts
could not preserve from the ravages of the prevailing distemper."
In 1797 and 1798 the fever again prevailed in Philadelphia with
fearful violence, and again Mr. Girard exhibited the same enlarged
philanthropy, and the same disregard of danger, by liberal contributions and personal services to the sick and dying.
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In 1802 Mr. Girard was elected a member of the City Councils,
and so continued for several years. Upon the expiration of the
charter of the first Bank of the United States, he established
his own private bank, in the building occupied by the late national
institution, and his first cashier was Mr. George Simpson, the
cashier of the late bank. During the war he rendered essential
services by his loans and subscriptions, and after its close became
a large stockholder in the second Bank of the United States.
For a period of upwards of forty years, although engaged in a
most extensive commerce, and the owner of numerous vessels
employed in a very large foreign trade, and in the latter part of it
the head of the greatest private bank in the Union, his life was spent
in his counting house in Water street or in his banking room in
Third street, varied by almost daily visits to his modest farm in
Passyunk. With a reputation extending over the United States
and Europe, as a wealthy and successful merchant and banker, his
habits were so retired, plain, and frugal, that his person was
unknown to many of his fellow-citizens. His fame and his name
are indissolubly connected with the great charity which creates the
subject of this dispute-his orphan college.
Stephen Girard died on the 26th December, 1881, and his will
was dated the 16th February, 1880, and was republished by two
accompanying codicils, dated the 25th December, 1830, and 20th
June, 1831.
His will commences, 11I, Stephen Girard, of the city of Philadelphia, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, mariner and merchant,
being of sound mind, memory, and understanding, do make and
publish this, my last will and testament in manner following, that
is to say," and after various devices and bequests, he proceeds in
the twentieth clause of his will as follows:
"And whereas I have for a long time been impressed with the
importance of educating the poor, and by placing them by the early
cultivation of their minds and the development of their moral principles, above the many temptations to which, through poverty and
ignorance, they are exposed; and I am particularly desirous to pro-
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vide for such a number of poor white male orphan children, as can
be trained in one institution, a better education, as well as a more
comfortable maintenance, than they usually receive from the application of the public funds; and whereas, together with the objects
just adverted to, I have sincerely at heart the welfare of the city of
Philadelphia-andas a part of it am desirous to improve the neighborhood of the river Delaware, so that the health of the citizens
may be promoted and preserved, and that the eastern part of the
city may be made to correspond better with the interior. Now, I
do give, devise, and bequeath all the residue and remainder of my
real and personal estate, of every sort and kind, wheresoever situate
(the real estate in iPennsylvania charged as aforesaid), unto the
mayor, aldermen, and citizens of Philadelphia, in trust," and
amongst others, to keep that part of the real estate situate in
the city and liberties of Philadelphia constantly in good repair.
The 21st clause provides, "And so far as regards the residue of
my personal estate in trust as to two millions of dollars,part thereof,
to apply and expend so much of that sum as be necessary in erecting, as soon as practicably may be, in the centre of my square of
ground, between High and Chestnut streets, and Eleventh and
Twelfth streets, in the city of Philadelphia(which square of ground
I hereby devote for the purposes hereinafter stated, and for no
other, forever) a permanent college, with suitable outbuildings,
sufficiently spacious for the residence and accommodation of at least
three hundred scholars, and the requisite teachers and other persons
necessary in such an institution as I direct to be established, and in
supplying the said college and out buildings with decent and suitable furniture, as well as books, and all things needful to carry into
effect my design."
Then followed minute and accurate directions for the erection of
his college. "1And when the college and appurtenances shall have
been constructed, and supplied with plain and suitable furniture and
books, philosophical and experimental instruments and apparatus,
and all other matters needful to carry," as he says, "my design into
execution, the income, issues and profits of so much of the said two
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millions of dollars as shall remain unexpended shall be applied to
maintain the college according to my directions."
Then follow ten paragraphs, in which he directs how his college
shall be organized and managed, and what orphans shall be admitted
into it. They must be poor white male orphans, between the ages
of six and ten years, and must be bound to the corporation of the
city-priority of application to entitle to preference, all other things
concurring. If more applicants than vacancies, preference shall be
given-" .First, to orphans born in the city of Philadelphia;
Secondly, to those born in any other part of Pennsylvania;
Tirdly, to those born in the city of New York (that being the first
port on the continent of North America at which I arrived ;) and
Lastly, to those born in the city of New Orleans, being the first port
on the said continent at which I first traded, in the first instance as
first officer, and subsequently as master and part owner of a vessel
and cargo."
If the income arising from the residue of the two millions, remaining after the construction and furnishing of the college and outbuildings, shall be inadequate to the construction of new buildings,
or the maintenance and education of as many orphans as may apply
for admission, then such sum as may be necessary for those purposes
shall be taken from the final residuary fund-" my design and
desire being," says the testator, "1that the benefits of said institution shall be extended to as great a number of orphans as the limits
of the said square and buildings thereon can accommodate." By
the 22d clause, there is a trust created in the city as to a further
sum of five hundred thousand dollars, the income of which is to be
exclusively applied1. To lay out, regulate, curb, light, and pave, a passage or street
on the east part of the city of Philadelphia, fronting the river Delaware, and to be called Delaware avenue, extending from Vine to
Cedar streets, and amongst other things, to completely clean and
keep clean, all the docks within the limits of the city, fronting on the
Delaware.
2. To remove and prohibit all wooden buildings within the limits
of the city.
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3. To widen Water street, east and west, from Vine street all the
way to South street, and to distribute the Schuylkill water therein.
By the twenty-fourth clause of his will, the remainder of the
residue of his personal estate is to be invested by his said trustee,
the corporation of the city, and, with its accumulations, to form a
permanent fund, the income of which is to be applied1st. To the further improvement and maintenance of the college.
2d. To establish a competent police for the security of the person
and property of the inhabitants of the city.
3d. To improve the city property, and the general appearanceof
the city itself, and to the reduction of taxes.
"To all of which objects," says the testator, "the prosperity of
the city, and the health and comfort of its inhabitants, I devote the
said fund as aforesaid, and direct the income thereof to be applied
yearly, and every year forever, after providing for the college, as
hereinbefore directed, as my primary object."
By his last codicil, Mr. Girard changed the location of his college
from the lot on Chestnut street, to the farm called Peel Hall, on the
Ridge road, in Penn township. By the acts of the 24th March,
and 4th April, 1882, the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of Philadelphia were enabled to carry into effect the improvements, and to
execute certain trusts contained in the will.
The corner-stone of the college was laid on the 4th of July, 1833,
and the building was finished, and the institution organized and
opened on the 1st January, 1848, fourteen years and a half afterwards; and nearly two millions of dollars were expended in its
erection. By actual expenditure, and by depreciation of the stocks
in which the great Charity Fund of two millions was invested, every
dollar of this most munificient appropriation for the benefit of the
poor white male orphans, the objects of Stephen Girard's bounty,
has entirely disappeared, and the college is now supported by the
income of the residuary real and personal estate, which was originally devoted to other objects.
If the simple plan of Stephen Girard had been strictly followed,
and if, as advised at the time, the whole of the personal property
had been gradually laid out in safe mortgages, in the city and county
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of Philadelphia, a very large portion of the two millions would have
been still remaining to maintain and increase the Girard College for
Orphans, and, at the same time, have improved the whole district,
by affording an additional sum to be laid out in the improvement of
real estate.
The college was erected under the charge of a building committee
of the Select and Common Councils, whilst a board of trustees regulated the other affairs of the institution, until it was abolished by
ordinance, on the 23d December, 1841, together with the offices of
secretary to the said board, and of president of the Girard College
for orphans. By the tenth section of the ordinance of the 21st
March, 1833, it was made the duty of the said trustees to prepare
as soon as practicable, and submit to Councils for their approbation,
the plan of a system of government and instruction for the said
college, "having reference to the will of Stephen Girard, so far as
they are express on this subject."
Dr. Francis Lieber having been charged by the trustees to draw
up this plan, on the 5th of December, 1833, submitted it to them
with an introductory report, which were both printed by order of
the board. In this report, the question of what was the meaning
of the word orphan in Mr. Girard's will, was fully and learnedly
discussed, and it was settled by Dr. Lieber, after a most extensive
and elaborate examination, to mean a fatherless child. " When
Mr. Girard," says he, "uses the word orphan, we are sure he
did not look for the etymology of the word, but used it in
that sense which presented itself as the readiest in his mind. Which
sense was this? Mr. Girard, a native Frenchman, spoke much
French and better than English, throughout his whole life. It is
possible, therefore, that though his will is drawn up in English, the
word orphan presented itself to his mind with that meaning which
orphelin has in French, because if two languages are equally ready
to a mind, as means of thought and utterance, which is much more
than the capacity of speaking two languages, phenomena take place
in the human mind, which can be known by personal experience
only. Sometimes we think in one language, sometimes in another;
sometimes we use one language, and yet transplant to certain words
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the meaning which belongs to their fellow words in the other language. We must then take the word orphan, in its English or French
sense, if we wish to ascertain its precise meaning as to the will in
question, and in both languagesthe word orphan, in common language means afatherless child, as the following note, and the succeeding lines, will show; it never means anything different, if
used to designate asylums, or any institutions for them. Whatever
may be the poet's use of the word orphan, as soon as it assumes in
any degree a legal or official sense, it signifies, and very naturally
so, fatherless children only.
After discussing briefly the question whether the word orphan in
the will of Mr. Girard includes children who have lost their mothers
only, he says: "A learned judge of our city has shown, as you
are well aware, that in those few cases in which the English courts
have been called upon to construe the word orphan, it has been
taken in the sense of a fatherless child. In our country, as I have
been informed by some of the first jurists, (Chancellor Kent and
Judge Story,) it is believed that no such official decision exists,
but that the meaning attached to the word orphan by the people at
large, is unquestionably that of a fatherless child, a meaning which
entirely agreed with our whole social system. I am fully aware of
the paramount importance of the mother in the education of a child.
This importance even increases the farther we descend in the scale
of social relations. I have enlarged upon this point in another work.
But our whole social system would be overturned were we no longer
to consider the father the chief of the house, the ' lord' of the family.
In all civilized countries, the law justly takes cognizance of the
death of a father; it appoints guardians, it administers the property of the minors, and watches over their interests; but in no
country does the law take cognizance of the death of the mother
only, except in some special cases, where her property has been
kept separately. The respective relations of the father and the
mother to the child are founded in the necessity of things, and therefore established by Him who assigned different spheres of activity
to everybody in the universe; relations and conditions against which
we can never act with impunity."
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The third article of the constitution framed by Dr. Lieber says,
"An orphan is a fatherless child."
This question had been discussed in the spring of 1833, in a
friendly correspondence between ex-President John Quincy Adams
and Judge Hopkinson, the first maintaining that the word orphan
includes all those children who had lost both or either parent ; the
latter that it was to be confined to those who had lost their father
only-in other to words, fatherless children. (14 Hazard's Register
of Pennsylvania, p. 188.)
Until 1847, annual appropriations were made out of the residuary
estate for the support of the police, improvement of the city property, and the general appearance of the city, and in effect to
diminish the burden of taxation, but they ceased, of course, with
the completion of the college-the erection of which had entirely
exhausted the special fund of two millions.
As the time approached for the organization and opening of the
college, the Legislature on the 27th February, 1847, passed an act
relative to the Girard College for Orphans, by which the guardians
of the poor were authorized, with the consent of the surviving
mother, guardian, or next friend, of any poor white male orphan
child, within this Commonwealth, between the age of six and ten
years, for whose admission to the Girard. College for Orphans application shall have been made, to bind such orphan child by indenture to the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of Philadelphia, as
trustees under the will of Stephen Girard, deceased, as an orphan
to be admitted into the said college, to be there maintained and
educated, according to the provisions, and in the manner and under
all the regulations and restraints directed or contained in the said
will; and the said corporation of the mayor, aldermen and citizens
of Philadelphia, was constituted the guardian of such orphan child.
On the 27th May, 1847, Councils passed an ordinance to provide
for the organization and management of the Girard College for
Orphans, which provided for the election by Councils of a board of
sixteen directors, who were to elect a president and secretary, and
to submit a plan for the government and instruction of the college,
to give notice of its opening, and to present estimates annually in
the month of December for the ensuing year.
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* By another ordinance, passed 16th September, 1847, to provide
for the opening of the Girard College for Orphans, the building
committee were authorized to deliver possession of the college, as
soon as completed, with the books, furniture, and apparatus, to the
directors, who were to furnish the building, from the college fund;
to give thirty days' notice of the intended opening, and who were
to prepare and publish, with the notice of the intended opening, a
form of applicationfor the admissionof orphzans, in which the regulations of the will of Stephen Girard, in regard to the birthplace,
reiidence, and age of each applicant, his name, health, and condition as to relatives, and other particulars useful to be known of each
orphan, shall be carefully observed. The ordinance then designated
the officers of the institution, who were to hold their offices during
the pleasure of the directors.
To the form of application for admission into the college, framed
and published by the directors, are attached several questions,
among which are the following:
2. When was he born ? 3. Where was he born? 4. What was
his father's name, and when and where did he die? 5. Is his
mother living ? and if she is, what is her name, and where does she
reside ? 10. Are there any pecuniary means, at the disposal of
his mother or other persons, for his maintenance and education ?
The building committee was dissolved, and the members of the
Select and Common Councils were constituted a standing committee
of visitation of the Girard College for Orphans, and a recording
secretary was elected by the board of directors, who is removable
at their pleasure, and whose duties are defined by the ordifiances of
the city.
The first president of the college, after its organization, was the
Honorable Joel Jones; the second and present one, Professor
William H. Allen, both men of high moral and intellectual worth,
and admirably fitted by temper and disposition for the administration of this noble charity.
In every annual report of the directors of the college, previous to
the present dispute, the original construction given to the will,
recognizing every fatherless child as an orphan, has been approved,
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and the whole institution has been conducted upon this principle.
On January 1st, 1851, Benjamin Gerhard, Esquire, in addressing
"the board of directors and officers and pupils of the college, with
the Councils of the city, and other city, county, and State officers,
and numerous parents and friends of the children, and other citizens,
assembled in the chapel of the institution," said: "1Who are
orphans ? This inquiry was answered by the counsel consulted by
the corporation, that such are orphans as have lost their fathers,
and the opinion was at once acquiesced in."
On the 1st January, 1850, the Hon. Joseph R. Chandler, president of the board, in addressing an audience similarly composed,
says, "Another objection was, that boys long separated from
maternal association and care would lose a part of that home love,
that filial affection, which lies so close to the foundation of all good
feeling, all pure benevolence. We have been enabled to keep the
control of the conduct of these children, to direct it and them in all
ways; and yet, to keep up their association with mother, sister,
brother, friend, so that at no time has the chain of affection been
weakened by neglect, or been allowed to rust for want of use. Homelove has been cultivated, andfiliaZ piety improved."
On the same occasion President Allen said, "The institution is
no longer without precedents for guide, for it has established them
for itself." After drawing a beautiful picture of one of its young
inmates, expiring in the arms of his mother, he says, "I am here
under that Being who is the God and Father of us all, to be a father
to the fatherless."
We thus see by a simple narrative of the origin and progress of
this great charity, that in the commencement the only difference of
opinion was, whether the term orphan did not include a motherless
as well as a fatherless child. Upon full discussion and a deliberate
examination, and after an unreserved communication with the first
jurists in the United States, the settled construction adopted, and
continued for a quarter of a century, was that it included fatherless
but not motherless children. This was published to the world and
sanctioned by the Legislature, and it has entered into the whole
administration of the-college, from its organization and opening on
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the 1st of January, 1848, until the month of June, 1858, a period
of more than the tenth of a century, and under the immediate eye
of the Grand Committee of 'Visitation, the Select and Common
Councils of the city.
In the tenth annual report to the Select and Common Councils
of the city of Philadelphia the directors say: "The condition of all
orphans, now within the institution, shows that at the time of their
admission fifty-four of them had neither father nor mother, and that
the remaining two hundred and eighty-one had mothers. During
the ten years elapsed since the opening of the institution, one hundred and sixteen of the orphans received into it had neither father
nor mother, and five hundred and forty-two had mothers. Of the
applicants for admission during the same period, two hundred and
seventy-three were without father or mother, and eleven hundred
and ninety-six had mothers only.
This sacred trust was confided by Stephen Girard to the mayor,
aldermen, and citizens of Philadelphia, who, by legislative enactment,
have been succeeded by the city of Philadelphia, under and subject
to the general provisions in "the consolidation act," that all the
estates and incomes now held in trust by the county (present city)
and each of the townships, districts, and other municipal corporations united by the act, shall be held by the city of Philadelphia
upon and for the same uses, trusts, limitations, charities, and conditions as the same are now held by the said corporations respectively.
The directors of the Girard College are the creatures of an ordinance, and are merely the agents of the real trustee, the city, and
yet in June, 1858, without (as far as it appears) taking the written
opinion of any eminent professional man, or consulting the legislative
authorities of the corporation, they make an entire change in the
administration of this charity, and narrow its range of objects, by
excluding all children who are fatherless but not motherless, as
recipients of Stephen Girard's bounty, by a new and restrictive
meaning given to the word orphan. The effect of this new regulation is. simply this-that the two hundred and eighty-one who
were orphans on the 1st January, 1858, are not orphans in June,
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1858, and, of course, should be expelled from the college; and that
the five hundred and forty-two children admitted as orphans since
the opening of the institution were never entitled to its benefits,
and have been maintained and educated by the funds of this charity,
in direct violation of the will, and of the clear intention of the testator. It was a decision that all former trustees and directors, all
former Councils, all the eminent jurists in this city and in the Union,
including Chancellor Kent and Judge Story, had entirely mistaken
the will of Mr. Girard; and that it was proper, immediately upon
this discovery being made, to change at once the whole course of
administration, and to exclude forever a very large class of orphans
from all participation in the benevolence of the great benefactor of
his adopted city.
In this state of affairs, it is perhaps proper to examine this question, to see if it is possible that so gross a mistake could have been
committed by the very able, enlightened, and conscientious citizens
who preceded the present direction of the college.
William Penn was born in the parish called St. Catherine's, near
the tower of London, and just outside of the walls of the city of
London, on the 14th day of October, (then the eighth month,) A.
D. 1644.
By the customs of the city, if a freeman of London died intestate,
possessed of personal property more than sufficient to pay his debts
and funeral expenses, his residuary estate was distributable in the
following manner: After deducting for the widow her apparel, and
the furniture of her bed-chamber, (which in London is called the
widow's chamber,) the property was divided into three parts, one of
which belonged to the widow, another to the children, and the third
to the intestate's administrator. This custom was the remains of
the old common law, and this portion which fell to the administrator,
or, as it is termed, the dead man's partor death's part,he formerly
appropriated to his own use, till the Stat. 1 Jac. II, cap. 17, declared
that the same should be subject to the statute of distributions.
The share of a child is called the orphanage part or share, and
the Lord Mayor's Court, or Court of Aldermen of the Outer
Chamber, which is a court of record of law and equity, has juris-
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diction of the distribution of intestates' estates, and the custody and
education of citizens' orphans. This branch of the equitable jurisdiction is exercised by the Mayor's Court in the character of a
Court of Orphans, which exercises a similar control over citizens'
orphans to that which the Court of Chancery does over infants in
general.
By a law made at an assembly, held at Philadelphia the 10th
day of the first month (March), 1683, it was enacted that the justices
of each respective county court shall sit twice every year, to inspect
and take care of the estates, usage, and employment of orphans,
which shall be called the Orphans' Court, and sit the first third day
of the week, in the first and eighth months yearly, that care may
be taken for those that are not able to take care of themselves,
which court, in the laws about testates' and intestates' estates, passed
in 1693, is called the Court of Orphans.
The proprietary, in his letter of the 16th of the 6th month, called
August, 1683, thus describes this court, "and spring and fall there is
an Orphan's Court in each county, to inspect and regulate the affairs
of orphans and widows."
We perceive, therefore, that William Penn brought with him from
the city of London, whose customs and usages were followed in
many particulars by his favorite city of Philadelphia, a construction
of the word orphan, which included a fatherless child. This was
the familiar understanding of the word in his days, as is proved by
King James's translation of the Bible, and by the writings of
Shakspeare, which immediately preceded his birth, and which
together form an ample and enduring record of pure and undefiled
English.
In the sixth edition of Jacob's Law Dictionary, published in 1750,
"Orphan (orphanus) is a fatherless child ;" and the same definition.
is given in .Tomlin's Law Dictionary, fourth London edition, by,
Granger, published in 1835 ; and in Wharton's Law Lexicon, published in London, in October, 1847, ana republished at Harrisburg
in 1848, in the New Library of Law and Equity, edited by Mr.
Troubat, Chief Justice Lewis, and Judge McCandless, it is thus&
26
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defined: "1Orphan, a fatherless child or minor, or one deprived of
both father and mother."
In the case of Powell vs. The Attorney General and _obert
Pendleton, 3 M'Ierivale, p. 48 decided July 24th, 1817, by Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, there was a bequest of the residue
of his estate by Joseph Pendleton "to the widows and children of
seaman belonging to the town of Liverpool." Upon a reference to
the master he reported among other charities, one under the will of
Elizabeth Cain, dated the 8th of June, 1778, whereby she directed
the residue of her estate, to be continued at interest, or placed out
on government securities, at the discretion of her executors, and,
after their death, of the Rectors of Liverpool for the time being,
the interest to be paid and distributed into and among such poor
sailors' widows and orphans, inhabitantsof Liverpool, as should, in
their judgment, be deserving objects of charity.
The Master of the Rolls held that it was a valid bequest, and
that the words were sufficiently descriptive of the last of the charities
mentioned in the master's report and a decree was made accordingly.
The subject of the orphanage share, and its distribution, under the
customs of London, are fully discussed by Vice Chancellor Shadwell
in Bruin vs. Knott, 12 Simons, 436.
The counsel for the appellee has collected numerous instances in
which the word orphan is the equivalent of fatherless child, as in the
Book of Lamentations, ch. 5, verse 3: "We are orphans and fatherless, and our mothers are as widows." In the translation of the
Septuagint version by Charles Thomson, published in Philadelphia
in 1808, the verse is rendered, "We are become orphans: our father
is no more; our mothers are like widows."
In the Psalter, in the Book of Common Prayer of the Church of
England, Psalm, LXVIII, v. 5, reads: "He is a Father of the
Fatherless, and defendeth the cause of the widows: even God in his
holy habitation." In the metrical version of the Psalms in the same
book, the verse is rendere-"5. Him from his empire of the skies,
To this low world compassion draws;
The orphan'sclaim to patronize,
And judge the injured widow's cause."
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See, also, in the Psalter, Psalm LXXXII, v. 3,and in the metrical
version, v. 2 and 3 Psalm CIX, v. 8, and 11, and in the metrical version by Brady and Tate, v. 9, 10, and 12.
. In the English Bible, Psalm X, v. 18, and in the metrical version
of the Psalms by Francis Rous, used in the Scottish Presbyterian
Church) fatherless and orphan are used as synonymous, as also in
Psalm CXL, v. 9: "The Lord preserveth the strangers, he
relieveth the fatherless and the widow; but the way of the wicked
he turneth upside down," which is rendered in the metrical version:
ItThe stranger's shield,

the idow's stay,
The orphan'8 help is he;
But yet by him the wicked's way
Turned upside down shall be."

In the Litany, in the Book of Common Prayer: "That it may
please Thee to defend and provide for the fatherless children and
widows, and all that are desolate and oppressed," which is rendered in
a Latin version, published in London, 1744, "Ut orphanisomnibus
et viduis, desolatis, et oppressis, prospicere digneris."
The word is originally Greek, and in Liddell and Scott's Greek
Lexicon it is translated "Orphaned, without parents, fatherless ;"
and in the same work it is said at Athens, the orphanophulakes
were guardians of orphans, who had lost their fathers in war. In
Ainsworth's Quarto Latin Dictionary, published in London in 1761,
an orphan is translated "parentibus vel altero parentum orbatus."
In the first American, from the Eleventh London edition of Dr.
Johnson's Quarto Dictionary, published in Philadelphia in 1819, it
is defined, after giving the Greek and French words, "a clild who
has lost father or mother or both," exemplified by quotations from
Spenser, Shakspeare, Sandys, Waller, Dryden and Nelson.
In Allison's Dictionary, published in 1813, at Burlington, for
M. Thomas and others the same definition is given, and Webster's definition is substantially the same. In the American edition of Rees' Cyclopedia, published by S. F. Bradford, Murray
Fairman, & Co., orphan is one that is fatherless, or that has neither
father nor mother.
One or two cases have been cited to support the proposition that
an orphan is one bereft of parents. By the third section of the act
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of 3d April, 1804, directing the mode of selling unseated lands for
taxes, minors are allowed five years, after the disability is removed,
to bring their action for the recovery of the lands. By the 4th section of the act of 13th March, 1815, to amend the same, the words
orphan or orphans are used instead of minor. By the 20th section
of the act of 12th April, 1842, and the 3d section of the act of 25th
April, 1850, Dunlop, pp. 866 and 1098, the words orphan or
orphans, in the act of 1815, shall be construed to mean minor or
minors.
In the case of Sidle vs. Walters, 5 Watts, 889, the word orphan
inthe act of 1815, is considered by Judge Rogers as the equivalent
of minor. In Brockway vs. Cooper, 8 Watts, 162, Judge Huston
held that land held by a father in trust for an infant child was not
within the exception; and in -Downing vs. ,Shoenberger, 9 Watts,
298, published in 1841, Judge Huston gave the definition, "An
orphan is one bereft of parents, a minor is one under twenty-one
years of age," which was entirely extrajudicial and inapplicable to
the case before him, as the father and mother of the infant were
both living.
The current, therefore, of English, American, and French
authority, being clearly in favor of the construction of the word
orphan in the will of Stephen Girard, originally adopted and consistently pursued, we are necessarily brought to the conclusion that
a fatherless child is an orphan, and if born within the limits of the city
of Philadelphia, as laid out by William Penn, and existing at the
death of the testator, comes within the first preference which he has
chosen to declare in relation to the objects of his bounty. Blenon's
-Estate,1 Brightly's Reports, 338; .Plymouthtownship vs. Jackson
township, 8 "Harris, 44; Commonwealth vs. The Erie and Northeast
Railroad Company, 8 Casey, 339.
We have discussed this question at great length, but we have
deemed it essential to the future management of this most munificent
charity, founded by a philanthropic citizen, that it should be settled
now and for all time to come.
The decree is affirmed, with costs.

ROSSELL vs. COTTOM.

In the Spreme Court of Pennsylvania. January,1859.
ROSSELL vs.

COTTOM.

1

1. The owner of a beast prone to commit trespasses, is liable for its injurious acts
without regard to the degree of care bestowed in controlling it. Per Thompson, T.
2. Trespass cannot be sustained against the owner of cattle, from injury com-

he is liable only in
mitted while in the custody of an agister; if liable at all,
case.

Error to the Common Pleas of Fayette county.
Alexander M. Hill, owning a large farm in Dunbar township,
leased or gave out two fields of it, on the shares, to John Cottom,
who was to put them in wheat and give Hill one-half the crop.
Hill, who was in the habit of taking droves of cattle to pasture on
other parts of the farm, received in one of his fields one hundred
head of cattle from Henry Rossell, agreeing to let them pasture
there for five weeks, at $20 a week. While in Hill's custody the
cattle broke through his fences and got into the fields leased by
Cottom, and did damage to his grain. Cottom sued Rossell before
a justice of the peace, and recovered judgment for 50 damages.
Defendant appealed to the common pleas. The justice's transcript
was then filed as narr. setting forth the cause of action thus :
"Plaintiff's claim is for damages sustained, by a drove of cattle
belonging to defendant breaking into his wheat' field, and destroying his (plaintiff's) wheat, in Dunbar township, Fayette *county.
Amount of damages claimed $50."
Defendant pleaded not guilty. Verdict was for plaintiff, for
$31 25.
On the trial, the court below were asked to charge the jury:
That if the cattle of the defendant were in the custody of A. I.
Hill, as an agister, at the time the trespass was committed, and the
damages were done, case would be the proper remedy, and the
plaintiff cannot recover in this action.
1 The facts of this case are taken from the Report in 6 Pitts. Leg. Jour. 364.
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Answer.-We think that in a case of agistment, the owner has
such a constructive possession as will enable him to maintain
trespass.
Hlowells, for plaintiff in error.
Jo7n K. Ewing, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THOmPSOm, J.-The law seems to be settled that the owner of
beasts prone to commit trespasses, is liable for injuries resulting
from such propensity, such as breaking into enclosures, and consuming and destroying grain, grass, herbage, &c. 8 Bl. Com. 211;
Bac. Ab., title Trespass, G. 2. So where a bull broke into an
enclosure, and gored a horse, that he died. DoyA vs. Ferris,
7 W. & S., 869. So in case of a dog killing sheep. Paff vs. BSlaclc,
7 Barr, 254. So, too, in case of a horse permitted to run in the
streets of a city, which, in its gambols, kicked and injured a person,
Goodman vs. Gay, 8 Harris, 194; and that the remedy is in trespass. The property in the animal raises the duty, on the part of the
owner, to guard against its mischievous propensities, and failing in
this, it holds him answerable for its injurious acts, without regard
to the degree of care bestowed in controlling it. " Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas" applies to all such cases. It is not a question of negligence, or want of due care on the part of the owner.
The case presented on this record, is as to the liability of the
owner of cattle for damages done by them, while in the possession
of another, under a contract of agistment. The plaintiff below
sued before a justice of the peace, and if trespass will lie against
the owner in such case, then the justice had jurisdiction; but if
the owner is only liable, if at all, for the negligence of his bailee,
the agister, the plaintiff must fail. The court below held the owner,
the defendant below, liable, and the plaintiff had judgment.
No direct authority is to be found in our own books, illustrative
of the case, and but few in the older books ; but it is said in 1 Esp.
N. P. 887, title Trespass, that "he who has the care, custody or
possession of the cattle who do the damage, is liable to this action,"

ROSSELL vs. COTTOM.

and adds, "as if agisted cattle break into another's land, the agister
is liable to the damages. So if the hogs of A were put into the
yard of B, and they break into C's land, action lies against B,
even though A's servant watches them, and so the owner had a
special possession." Dawtry vs. Hfuggins, Clayt. 83; Trialsper
pais, 201. In 2 Rolle's Ab. 546, it is laid down in one case, that if
the beasts of A, agisted by B, trespass on the close of C, it is in
the election of C to bring trespass against A or B. This is cited
in Bac. Ab. P., 498, (Bouv. ed.) and it is immediately succeeded by
a reference to the case in Clayton, as follows : "1but it is laid down
in another case, that an action in such case lies only against the
agister of the beast. Bateman's case, Clayton, 33." This is an
error on the part of the author; Bateman's case is not reported in
Clayton, it is referred to in the case of Dawtry vs. Huggins.
The principle, however, is correctly stated. But in Sand. on P1.
and Ev., Bateman's case, Clayton, 33, is cited for authority, that
either A or B, the owner or agister, may be sued in trespass. This
is also an error, both as to the principle and name of the case.
.Dawtry vs. luggins, is the case reported in Clayt. 33, and is as
follows: "It was ruled upon an evidence, if A hath the custody
of the goods of B, as here, it was hogs put into the defendant's
yard, if these do trespass to the land of C, adjoining, A shall be
punished in trespass, and this though the owner's servant did
wait upon them; and here it was proved the servant of A did
also wait on them, and serve them, therefore they were in his special possession; and the like matter was relied on in the case of
Stephen Bateman of Wakefield, for agist cattle, if they do commit
trespass, the owner of the soil where, &c., shall answer for that trespass." York Assizes, 1651. This case is accurately cited in 1 Esp.
N. P. supra; Neither Dawtry vs. Buggins, nor Bateman's case,
supports the doctrine that either the owner or agister of cattle may,
at the election of the injured party, be sued for the trespass of
agisted cattle. They are authority to the contrary. The case in
Rolle's Ab. 546, refers to the year books, 7 H. 4, which does not
sustain it, being but a question of pleading, whether a stranger to
an award could plead it. There was no judgment in the case.
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But, independently of authority, it seems clear, that the case is
with the plaintiff in error. We have said that the law raises a duty
on part of the owner to guard against trespasses of animals prone
to commit them. This is undoubted as Ao the absolute owner, nor
does it seem to be doubted as applicable to the qualified owner in
possession. But the point of the argument is, that either may be
made liable in trespass for the depredations of agisted cattle. This
cannot be maintained by any legal logic. The reason of liability
in such cases, arises out of the legal requirements to take the
necessary care and control of them, so as to prevent injury, which
implies not only the duty, but the right of control. The law must
not be so administered as to destroy the relation altogether. And
would not this follow, if I must answer in trespass, if my horse,
being hired or loaned, break into the field of another, while in the
custody of the hirer or borrower, or my agisted cattle commit a
trespass while under the control of the agister ? While in his
custody and in his enclosure, how can I control them ? I could
not enter upon his premises to do so, without myself becoming a
trespasser, and for omitting to do so, the principle contended for
would make me a trespasser for injuries done by them. It is not
the ownership of the trespassing creature, but the possession and
use that raises the liability ; if this were not so, there would of
necessity be an end to borrowing and hiring. The relation is of
the same character with that of agistment, they are all bailments.
The bailee in all such cases, has the legal custody for the purpose
of the bailment, has the power of control and management for its
full accomplishment-does not act therein by the command of
the owner, but is the qualified or special owner himself. He stands
in the place of the owner, for 'the purposes specified, has acquired
the temporary ownership for this very purpose. Being thus the
temporary owner, it is not denied that the trespasses of the cattle
are his trespasses. Upon what principle can they be the trespasses of another, although he be the owner ?
Not upon the principle of control, for that he has parted with.
If it exists at all, it must be on account of the bailee's mismanagement. To redress this, trespass is not the remedy, it must be case.
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In T"gales vs. Ford, 8 Halsted, 26T, trespass was brought against
the owner of a stud horse, for injury done by biting and kicking
plaintiff's man and horse. At the time of the injury, the horse
was in the possession of a third person, who had him in the vicinity
in service. Per Cur. The action is misconceived, "if any action
can be sustained at all, it must be in form, of trespass on the case."
So we think here, and that the learned judge of the common pleas
erred in ruling that the action of trespass was well brought against
the owner of the cattle, for an injury committed while in the custody
of the agister. If liable at all, he was only so in case, and of this
the justice had no jurisdiction. This view of the case renders
unnecessary the consideration of the other assignments of error.
Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

In the Supreme Court of the United States-September Term, 1858.
SAMUEL PEARCE, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, VS. THE MADISON AND INDIANAPOLIS RAILROAD CO. AND THE PERU AND INDIANAPOLIS RAILROAD CO.
1. A corporation can make no valid contract except in the course of its business

and within the scope of its charter, and any departure from that business is an
excess of authority in its officers.

2. Two railroad corporations before the date of the notes on which this action was
brought were consolidated by special agreement, but without authority of law,
and acted under a common board of management and thus carried on the business of both roads, and while so acting purchased a steamboat, for which the

notes were given.

They afterwards dissolved their joint business relations, and

each road conducted its own affairs; while united the notes sued on were given.
Held, first, that persons dealing with the defendants must take notice of the limi.
tations imposed upon their authority by the act of incorporation, and second,

that these notes"not having been given by authority of law, no recovery could be
had on them.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District
of Indiana.

IWe are indebted to our excellent cotemporary, The Cincinnati Weekly Law
Gazette, for this opinion.
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The opinion of the Court in which the facts appear, was delivered
by
CAMPBELL, J.-The defendants are separate corporations, existing under the laws of Indiana, and were created to construct distinct lines of railroad that connect at Indianapolis, in that State.
The plaintiff is the assignee of five promissory notes, that were executed under conditions set forth in the declaration, and of which he
had notice. The two corporations (defendants,) some time before
the dates of the notes, were consolidated by agreement, and assumed
the name of the Madison, Indianapolis and Peru Railroad Company,
and under that name, and under a common board of management,
conducted the business of both lines of road.
While the business of the two corporations was thus directed and
managed, the President of the consolidated company gave these notes
in its name in payment for a steamboat, which was to be employed
on the Ohio river, to run in connection with the railroads. After
the execution of the notes and the acquisition of the boat, this
relation between the corporations was dissolved by due course of
law, and at the commencement of the suit each corporation was
managing its own affairs. The plaintiff claims that the two corporations are jointly bound for the payment of the notes; but the
Circuit Court sustained a demurrer to the declaration.
The rights, duties and obligations of the defendants are defined
in the acts of the Legislature of Indiana, under which they were
organized, and reference must be had to these to ascertain the validity of their contracts. They empower the defendants respectively
to do all that was necessary to construct and put in operation a
railroad between the cities which are named in the acts of incorporation. There was no authority of law to consolidate these corporations, and to place both under the same management, or to subject
the capital of the one to answer for the liabilities of the other; and
so the courts of Indiana have determined. But in addition to that
act of illegality, the managers of these corporations established a
steamboat line, to run in connection with the railroads, and thereby
diverted their capital from the objects contemplated by their charters, and exposed it to -perils, for which they afforded no sane-
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tion. Now, persons dealing with the managers of a corporation,
must take notice of the limitations imposed upon their authority by
the act of incorporation. Their powers are conceded, in consideration of the advantage the public is to receive from their discreet
and intelligent employment, and the public have an interest that
neither the managers nor stockholders of the corporation shall
transcend their authority. In 2IcGregor vs. ie Official anager
of the Deal and Dover Bailway Co., (16 L. and Eq. 180,) it was
considered that a railway company, incorporated by act of Parliament, was bound to apply all the funds of the company for the purposes directed and provided for by the act, and for no other purpose
whatever, and that a contract to do something beyond these was a
contract to do an illegal act, the illegality of which appearing by
the provisions of a public act of Parliament, must be taken to be
known to the whole world. In Coleman vs. T]he Eastern Counties
Railway Co., 10 Bear., 1, Lord Langdale, at the suit of a shareholder, restrained the corporation from using its funds to establish a
steam communication between the terminus of the road (Harwich)
and the northern ports of Europe. The directors of the company
vindicated the appropriation as beneficial to the company, and that
similar arrangements were not unusual among the railway companies. Lord Langdale said: "Ample powers are given for the
purpose of constructing and maintaining the railway, and for doing
all those things required for its proper use when made. But I
apprehend that it has nowhere been stated that a railway company
as such, has power to enter into all sorts of other transactions.
Indeed it has been very properly admitted that railway companies
have no right to enter into new trades or business not pointed out
by the acts. But it has been contended that they have a right to
pledge, without limit, the funds of the company for the encouragement of other transactions, however various and extensive, provided
that the object of that liability is to increase the traffic upon the
railway, and thereby to increase the profit to the shareholders.
"There is, however, no authority for anything of that kind. It
has been stated that these things, to a small extent, have been frequently done since the establishment of railways; but unless the
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acts so done can be proved to be in conformity with the powers
given by the special acts of Parliament under 'vhich those acts are
done, they furnish no authority whatever. In The East Anglian
Railway Co. vs. The .Eastern Counties Railway Co., 11 0. B.,
803, the court say, the statute incorporating the defendants' company gives no authority respecting the bills in Parliament promoted
by the plaintiffs, and we are therefore bound to say that any contract relating to such bills is not justified by the act of Parliament,
is not within the scope of the authority of the company as a corporation, and is therefore void."
We have selected these cases to illustrate the principle upon
which the decision of this case has been made. It is not a new
principle in the jurisprudence of this court. It was declared in the
early case of Head vs. Providence Insurance Co., 2 Cranch, 127,
and has been re-affirmed in a number of others that followed it.
Bank of Augusta vs. Earle, 13 Pet., 519 ; Perrine vs. C~hes, and
Ohio Railroad Co., 9 How., 172.
It is contended that because the steamboat was delivered to the
defendants and has been converted to their use, they are responsible- It is enough to say in reply to this that the plaintiff was not
the owner of the boat, nor does he claim under an assignment of
the owner's interest. His suit is instituted on the notes, as an
endorsee, and the only question is, had the corporation the capacity
to make the contract, in the fulfilment of which they were executed ?
The opinion of the court is, that it was a departure from the business of the corporation, and that their officers exceeded their
authority.
Judgment affirmed.
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In the )istrict Court of the United States for the D)istrict of
Xassachusets-March,1859.
BROWN vs. OVERTON.
1. A seaman receiving an injury in the performance of his duties must be cured at
the expense of the ship.
2. On a voyage from Calcutta to Boston, and twenty-five days before passing in
sight of St. Helena, a seaman fell from aloft and broke both legs. Held, that it
was the duty of the master to have put into St. Helena for the cure and relief of
the seaman.
:3. The master was also held responsible for neglect during the passage and after
reaching Boston.

J. Hf. Prince, for the libellant.
S. RI. Russell, for the respondent.
J.-The libelant was a seaman, and the respondent
master of the ship Modern Times, on a voyage from Calcutta to
Boston. When about fifty days out from the landheads, the libelant, while reefing a topsail in the night time, was thrown from the
yard by the sudden motion of the sail and violence of the wind, and
by his fall, broke both legs below the knees. There was no person
on board skilled in medicine or surgery, but the master, with the
aid of a passenger and one of the crew, set the bones and secured
them by bandages and splints as well as he could, and the libelant
was then placed in a hammock in the forward cabin, whence, after
three or four days, he was removed to the forecastle, and there continued lying in his hammock until four days after the arrival of the
ship in Boston. He was then carried to the Massachusetts Hospital. It was there found that the left leg was somewhat distorted,
but this evil was corrected by the eminent surgeons of that institution. The right leg was in a much worse condition. The foot was
turned out so as to be at right angles with its natural position, and
this it was found impossible to remedy. This distortion, and the
deformity and disability arising therefrom, must remain for life.
There are three grounds of complaint against the master:
First-That he did not put into St. Helena. Second-Want of
SPRAGUE,
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proper care and attention during the passage. Third-Neglect
after arriving at Boston.
As to the first: The accident happened on the 30th of March,
1858, the vessel then being twenty-five days sail from St. Helena.
There was a conversation between the master and officers and the
only passenger on board, as to the necessity of going into that
island; the question being whether, if they retained the libelant on
board, mortification would take place in passing the equator. The
master decided not to go into St. Helena, although he intended to
make the island for the purpose of correcting his longitude. On
the morning of the 25th of April they made St. Helena, distant
about forty miles, having passed it in the night, but the wind was
such that they could have reached it even then in eight or ten
hours. Some question has been made as to the degree of surgical
skill which could have been found at St. Helena; but there is no
doubt that some degree of professional skill, as well as nursing and
rest, could there have been obtained, and to this the libelant was
entitled. A seaman disabled in the service of a ship is to be cured
at the expense of the ship. To this his right is as perfect as to food
or wages. It is incumbent upon the master to furnish means of
cure, and to use all reasonable exertions for that purpose. Scarcely
a case can be presented where this obligation applies with greater
force than the present. This seaman, at the command of his officer, had exposed his life and his limbs for the preservation of the
ship. He was thrown from the yard arm, and both legs were badly
fractured. There was no surgical skill on board, and the unceasing
motion of the ship, and the accidents and discomforts to which he
was necessarily exposed, were unfavorable to his cure. The master
intended to go within sight of St. Helena, and if he had shaped his
course to go into port, he might, with only a few hours detention,
have consulted the American Consul, obtained surgical aid and
advice, and ascertained how far it was necessary or would be useful
for the libelant to be left on shore. The reason assigned by the
master, since his return, for not having left this seaman at St. Helena,
is that it would have occasioned expense. This presents not the
least extenuation. It is nierely saying that if he had performed his
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duty the owners would have been subjected to a burden which the
law imposes.
The master ought to have gone into St. Helena, to have given to
the seaman the means of cure which that place afforded, and for
this neglect the libellant is entitled to recover such damages as he
sustained.
As to the second ground of complaint. No blame attaches to the
master during the first three or four days, nor for removing the
seaman to the forecastle. It is not shown that the cabin was a
better place. After his removal to the forecastle, the master visited
him occasionally, but not often, and the steward carried him food
regularly from the cabin table. This was all the attention afforded
him by the master's order. No one was directed to render him any
further service.
The accident happened on the 30th of March. The vessel did
not arrive in Boston till the 10th of June. For more than sixty
days he lay in his hammock, in the forecastle, utterly helpless, and
for a portion of the time in great pain. Yet whatever his wants or
his sufferings, there was no one there whom he had a right to call
upon for relief. He was left to the chance and voluntary attentions
of other seamen. No reason is assigned for this neglect. The
ship was not short-handed, and the weather during most of the
passage was mild. Some one of the ship's company might have
been designated to care for and watch over this disabled seaman,
and relieved from his other duties except in case of emergency.
That this would have alleviated the sufferings of the libelant, there
can be no doubt; how far it might have prevented the distortion of
the right leg, it is impossible to state, as it cannot be known whether
that misfortune was the result of the original imperfect setting of
the bone or subsequent displacement. And it is now uncertain
how far it could be remedied on ship-board. I think the libelant
did not receive that attention during the passage, which the master
could and ought to have furnished.
The third ground of complaint is neglect after the arrival of the
vessel at Boston. The ship came to anchor at that place in the
afternoon of Thursday, and hauled into the wharf about one o'clock
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on Friday, on which day the crew were discharged and left the ship.
The master left on Saturday, and did not return until Monday.
No one remained by the ship but the mate, who paid no attention
to the libelant, except sending him food from on shore. It rained
on Saturday and Sunday. The forecastle was a scene of confusion
and discomfort, from the seamen preparing and taking away their
luggage, and from rigging being put into the forecastle, and the
condition in which it was left.
On Monday the master proposed to send the libelant to the
Marine Hospital at Chelsea, but at his request, and by the interposition of a friend, he was carried to the Massachusetts Hospital.
It is alleged that a permit to carry this seaman to the Marine
Hospital could not be obtained till Monday ; but of this there is no
proof, and I cannot believe that a seaman arriving in a disabled
condition has been kept out of the Marine Hospital for three or
four days from mere official formality.
But even if it had been so, it would not excuse the master.
Competent surgeons were at hand, and one should have been called
immediately, and suitable nursing and lodging also should have been
provided at the expense of the ship, either at the Massachusetts
Hospital or elsewhere. The master neither performed this duty
himself, nor made report to the owners, that they might assume it,
and for this omission he must be held responsible.
It remains only to determine what amount of damages shall be
awarded. The libelant is entitled to indemnity for all that he has
suffered from the omission of the master to go into St. Helena, and
from his culpable neglect during the passage, and after arriving at
Boston. The first ground is that mainly relied upon. It is insisted
that the permanent deformity and disability are owing to that
unjustifiable omission. The accident happened on the 30th of
March. On the 25th of April, the vessel could have put into St.
Helena. Were the bones of the right leg then so united and consolidated that they could not have been restored to their natural
position, and the permanent distortion have been prevented ? Upon
this question two of the surgeons of the Massachusetts Hospital
have been called as witnesses. One gave an opinion in the affirma-
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tive," and the other in the negative. The former however, was expressed with more confidence. The latter not being unqualified.
The preponderance of evidence is in favor of the assertion that
the curative process had not gone so far in twenty-six or even
thirty days from the accident, but that the distortion could have
been remedied by surgical skill, This, however, is doubtful. It is
also uncertain what degree of surgical skill could have been found
at St. Helena. These doubts would have been prevented if the
master had performed his duty. By going into that port it would
have been ascertained what could be accomplished. Still I cannot
give to the libelant the same measure of damages as if it were
certain that the whole permanent injury arose from the master's
default. I must make a considerable deduction by reason of the
uncertainty that remains in this respect. What the libelant has
certainly lost is the chance or probability of a remedy or cure, more
or less complete, by being carried into St. Helena. And for this
loss, as well as for what he has suffered on the minor grounds of
complaint, he is entitled to a fall indemnity.
Decree for 8600 and costs.
From this decree the respondent appealed.

Ia the Police Court of Boston, Massachusetts-April,1859.
C05MMNONWEALTH,

ON COMPLAINT OF WALL vs. M'LAURII

V. COOKE.

1.The regulation of the School Committee of Boston, which requires that
pupils in the public schools shall, among other things, "learn the Ten Commandments, and repeat them once a week," is not a violation of the constitutional
provision which secures to the citizen liberty of conscience and of worship.
2. A teacher in the public schools has a right to enforce that regulation, by the
corporal chastisement of a child refusing to repeat the Ten Commandments, though
that 'refusal proceeds from a conscientious objection on the part of the child to
the particular version of the Bible used, and is made by the direction and under
the authority of his father.
3. The authority of a parent cannot justify the disobedience, by a child, of the regulations of a school.
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4. A teacher in the public schools is not liable, criminally, for the infliction of corporal punishment in school, if in severity it does not exceed the nature and magnitude of the offence, and is not inflicted in haste or with malice.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts fully appear, was
delivered by
J.-The complaint in this case was made on the 16th
day of March last, and charges that "1McLaurin F. Cooke, teacher,
on the 14th day of March, 1859, committed an assault and battery
on Thomas J. Wall, son of the complainant, under circumstances of
aggravation; that Thomas was eleven years of age, a pupil in the
Eliot School, and defendant a teacher, and that defendant struck,
beat and wounded Thomas with a stick for the space of thirty minutes,
inflicting serious wounds."
Upon this complaint a warrant was issued by order of court, the
defendant Cooke arrested, and in open court pleaded not guilty to
the complaint.
Upon this issue, evidence was introduced on the part of the Commonwealth to prove the assault, and by the defendant explanatory
of the matter, and from the evidence so introduced, the following facts
appeared:
That the defendant was the first Assistant Teacher in the Eliot
School, Samuel W. Mason, Principal; that Thomas J. Wall was a
scholar in said school, and had been for six or seven years last past.
That during his attendance the Bible in the common English version
was read in the school, and that the scholars sufficiently advanced
were required to read or commit to memory the Lord's Prayer and
the Ten Commandments.
That by the rules and regulations of the school, the Commandments were repeated by the scholars every Monday morning, and
that the boy Wall had repeated them without objection until Monday,
March the 7th, when he refused, and was discharged from the
school. That an interview was had between the father of the boy
and the Principal of the school, and the boy returned to the school.
That on Monday, the 14th of March, he refused again to read or
xepeat the Commandments, giving as reasons for so doing, that his
MAINE,
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father had agreed with Mr. Mason that he should not say them.
That his father had told him for his life not to say them, and that
his priest had also told him not to say them, and that on the Sunday
previous to the 14th the priest (Father Wiget,) while addressing
nine hundred children of St. Mary's Church, of whom Wall was one,
told them not to be cowards to their religion, and not to read or
repeat the Commandments in school, that if they did he would read
their names from the altar.
That Wall came to the school on Monday with the determination
not to read or repeat them.
That before the 14th, Father Wiget had promised to give him a
medal, blessed, and that since the 14th he had given it to him; that
he had given them to other boys, and he knew no reason for his
giving it to him; that Father Wiget said at the time he was a
good boy.
It further appeared, from the evidence, that there was a concerted
plan of action on Monday, the 14th, between many of the boys to
refuse to obey the orders of the school, if required to read or repeat
the Lord's Prayer or the Commandments, and that two-thirds of te
scholars composing the school where Wall attended, and numbering
about sixty, declared their intention not to comply with the rules
of the school in that particular. And from all the evidence it was
manifest that Wall was one of, if not the principal actor. He
refused to repeat the Commandments for the reasons given. He
was told by Mr. Mason that his father had requested him to make
him repeat them, and that if he did not, to punish him severely.
Wall still refusing, was punished by the defendant with a rattan
stick, some three feet in length, and three-eighths of an inch thick,
by whipping upon his hands. From the time when the punishment
commenced to the time when it ended, repeated inquiries were made
of Wall if he would comply with the requirements of the school.
Some thirty minutes' time was occupied in the whole. During this
time there were several intervals, at two of which the defendant
was absent from the room some little time. The blows were not
given in quick succession, but with deliberation.
During the

COMMONWEALTH vs. COOKE.

chastisement Wall was encouraged by others, who told him not
to give up. This was while defendant was absent from the room.
The master ceased to punish, when Wall submitted to the requirements of the school.
From the effect of the punishment Wall's hands were swollen, he
was taken to the sink by the defendant twice, and his hands held in
water. The physician who saw his hands in the afternoon of Monday,
and prescribed for them, after describing their appearance, says that
he did not think the injury very severe; that at the time he thought
he would recover from it in twenty-four hours.
Now, was the punishment so inflicted without justification, and in
violation of the constitutional rights of Wall ? and was the punishment excessive ? ]Before considering the constitutional rights of
the pupil while in school, it may be proper to see by what right or
authority the schools themselves exist.
The constitution recognizes the existence of schools, and declares
that "all moneys raised by taxation in the towns and cities for the
support of public schools, and all moneys that may be appropriated
by the State for the support of common schools, shall be applied to
and expended to no other schools than those which are conducted
according to law, under the order and superintendence of the authorities of the town or city in which the money is to be expended ; and
such moneys shall never be appropriated to any religious sect, for
the maintenance, exclusively, of its own schools." The schools
recognized by the constitution are those which are to be conducted
according to law, under the order and superintendence of the
authorities of the town or city where the moneys are to be expended.
The statutes by which our schools are established and governed,
provide "that it shall be the duty of the President, Profesbors, and
Tutors of the University at Cambridge, and of the several colleges,
and of all preceptors and teachers of academies, and of all other
instructors of youth, to exert their best endeavors to impress on the
minds of children and youth, committed to their care and instruction,
the principles of piety, justice, and a sacred regard to truth, love to
their country, humanity and universalbenevolence, sobriety, industry,
and frugality, chastity, moderation, and temperance, and those other

COMMONWEALTH vs. COOKE.

virtues which are the ornaments of human society, and the basis upon
which a republican constitution is founded."
By statute it is also provided, "that the School Committee of
each town and city in the Commonwealth, shall require the daily
reading oJ some portion of the Bible in the common Bnglish version,

and shall direct what other books shall be used in the public schools."
The School Committee for the city of Boston, in their published
regulations, direct and reccommend as follows:"The morning exercises of all the schools shall commence with
reading a portion of the Scripture in each room by the teachers, and
the Board recommend that the reading be followed with the Lord's
Prayer repeated by the teacher alone, or chanted by the teacher
and the children in concert, and that the afternoon session close
with appropriate singing, and also that the pupils learn the Ten
Commandments, and repeat them once a week."

Do these laws and regulations, when carried out, conflict with the
constitutional rights of any pupil? It is claimed that they do, and
the constitution is cited, or that portion of it supposed to apply to
the case, which is as follows:"That it is the right as well as the duty of all men in society
publicly and at stated seasons to worship the Supreme Being, the
great Creator and Preserver of the universe. And no subject shall
be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping God in the manner and seasons most agreeably to the
dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious professions or
sentiments, provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct
others in their religious worship."
Can the position assumed be a correct one? Our schools are the
granite foundation on which our republican form of government rests.
They were created and are now sustained by our constitution and
laws, and the almost unanimous voice of the people. But a pupil
in one of them has religious scruples of conscience, and cannot
read or rep eat the Commandments, unless from that version of
the Bible which his parent may approve. Now what is to be
done in such a case? If he has a constitutional right to refuse to read or to repeat them from books furnished for the
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school by statute law, then to punish him in any way would be
a great wrong. He could not be expelled from school for standing
upon his constitutional rights. Neither could he be punished by
corporal punishment; and if the plea of conscience and his constitutional rights would protect him from reading the Bible, is it not
equally clear that he could not be compelled to hear it read ?
If,then, these are constitutional rights, secured to the children
in our common schools, at any time when one pupil can be found
in each public school in the Commonwealth with conscientious scruples against reading the Bible, or hearing it read, the Bible may be
banished from them, and so the matter of education may be taken
from the State government and placed in the hands of a few children.
Not Roman Catholic children alone. For if the plea of conscience
is good for one form of sectarian religion, it is good for another.
The child of a Protestant may say, "I am a conscientious believer
in the doctrine of universal salvation. There are portions of the
Bible read in school which it is claimed by others tend to prove a
different doctrine; my conscience will not allow me to hear it read,
or to read it." Another objects as a believer in baptism by sprinkling.
"There are passages in the Bible which are believed by some to teach
a different doctrine. I cannot read it, conscience is in the way."
Still another objects as a believer in one God. "The Bible, it is
claimed by some, teaches a different doctrine; my conscience will
not allow me to read it or to hear it read." And so, every denomination may object for conscience sake, and war upon the Bible and
its use in common schools.
Those who drafted and adopted our constitution, could never
have intended it to meet such narrow and sectarian views. That
section of the constitution was clearly intended for higher and nobler
purposes. It was for the protection of all religions-the Buddhist
and the Brahmin, the Pagan and the Jew, the Christain and the
Turk, that all might enjoy an unrestricted liberty in their religion,
and feel an assurance that for their religion alone, they should
never, by legislative enactments, be subjected to fines, cast into
prisons, starved in dungeons, burned at the stake, or made to feel
the power of the inquisition.
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It was intended to prevent persecution by punishing for religious
opinions. The Bible has long been in our common schools. It was
placed there by our fathers, not for the purpose of teaching sectarian
religion, but a knowledge of God and of his will, whose practice is
religion. It was placed there as the book best adapted from which
to "teach children and youth the principles of piety, justice, and a
sacred regard to truth, love to their country, humanity, and a
universal benevolence, sobriety, moderation and temperance, and
those other virtues which are the ornaments of human society,
and the basis upon which a republican constitution is founded."
But, in doing this, no scholar is requested to believe it, none to
receive it as the only true version of the laws of God. The teacher
enters into no argument to prove its correctness, and gives no
instructions in theology from it. To read the Bible in school for
these and like purposes, or to require it to be read without sectarian
explanations, is no interference with religious liberty.
If the plea of conscience is good against the reading or use of the
Bible, why is it not equally good against any other book, or the
language in which the book may be printed?
The Jew, for conscience sake, will only read the Scriptures from
the Torah,' and why may not the pupils in our schools refuse to read
the Bible, until they are sufficiently learned to read it in the original
Hebrew? If tender consciences may rightfully claim such unlimited
power, what constitutional injustice is daily done in our courts of law,
by swearing the Protestant by the uplifted hand, the Roman Catholic
upon the Evangelists, the Jew upon the Pentateuch, while facing the
East, with his head covered, and refusing to admit the Infidel as a
witness at all !
There is another part of the'case, which should here be considered.
It is the argument, that in disobeying the commands of the school,
Wall was acting under the lawful authority of his father.
Can the authority of the parent, and that of the teacher, over the
pupil, exist at the same time, in and during the hours of school?
That school approaches nearest to perfection that most resembles
IParcbments upon which are written in Hebrew the laws of Moses.
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a well governed family, where nothing is required excepting that
which is believed to be for the best interests of every member, and
where all requirements are obeyed, and where all are subject to
one head. If "a house be divided against itself, that house
cannot stand ;" so will it ever be with our schools, if the authority
of the master and that of the parent enter the school-room together.
The master is there by authority of law. He is also there by the
implied authority and consent of the parent, who sends his child to
him for instruction, knowing at the same time the duties of both
master and pupil. By sending his child to school he surrenders
so much of his parental rights over the child as would, if exercised,
conflict with the reasonable rules and regulations of the school.
If this is not so, why may not the parent command his child
while in school to read from one book and to reject another. And
what are the rights and what the authority of the master in such a
case ? What becomes of the power of the School Committee, whose
business it is to direct what books shall be used in the public schools ?
From the argument it is understood that in this case there are
conflicting rights, the rights of conscience of the scholar, the
rights of the parent over him, and the rights of the defendant as
master, and that these rights are to be upheld by compromises.
What the compromise is to be, the court is not informed. Can
it be that those pupils whose religion teaches them that the Douay
version of the Bible is the only true record of the Scriptures,
shall be permitted to read and repeat the Lord's Prayer and the
Ten Commandments from their own Bible? Grant the requesIN
and what follows?
It is enacted by the statute "that the School Committee shall
never direct to be purchased or used in avy of the town schools any
school books which are calculated to favor the tenets of any particular sect of Christians." So by such a compromise, we see the very
thing would be done which is now complained of, that of favoring
the tenets of a particular religion.
Is the compromise to be that of a division of the school moneys,
allowing separate schools to be carried on in accordance with religious
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views? Our Constitution declares that no money raised by taxation
for the support of schools shall ever be appropriatedto any religious
sect for the maintenance, exclusively, of its own schools.
The last point for the consideration of the court is, was the offence
one which required punishment? Had the master the right to
inflict corporal punishment? and, if he had, was the punishment
excessive, or inflicted through malice? The apparent magnitude
of the offence depends somewhat upon the stand-point from which it
is viewed. From one aspect, it appears to be of the most innocent
and simple nature. A child desired the privilege in school of reading the Commandments from his Bible, the only one that his religion
would allow him to read. It would seem to a generous mind tyrannical, to deny so simple and innocent a request; and it would indeed
be so, were that the whole of the matter.
That most wonderful specimen of human skill and human invention, the Suspension Bridge, that spans the dark, deep waters at
Niagara, with strength to support the heaviest engines with cars
laden with their freight, and defying the whirlwind and the tempest,
is but the perfection of strength from the most feeble beginning.
A tiny thread was but safely secured across the abyss, and final
success became certain. Thread after thread were interchanged,
until iron cables bound opposite shores together. May not the
innocent pleading of alittle child for its religionin school, if granted,
be used like a silken thread, to first pass that heretofore impassable
gulf which lies between Church and State, and when onced secured,
may not stronger cords be passed over it, until cables, which
human hands cannot sever, shall have bound Church and State
together forever P
As for the right of inflicting punishment in schools by the teacher,
it has been conceded ever since our schools were established, if in
severity it does not exceed the nature and magnitude of the offence,
and it is not inflicted in haste, or with malice on the part of the
teacher. The case finds that the father of Wall had requested that
he should be kept in school and made to repeat the Commandments,
and that he should be punished severely if he refused. It was not
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necessary that the father should give his consent for the inflicting
of reasonable punishment, neither can the teacher justify an excessive
punishment by authority from the father. The parent cannot delegate a power that he does not possess, and as he could not punish
his child severely without a sufficient cause, neither could the
teacher do it without sufficient cause. The nature and extent of
the punishment have already been considered. It now becomes
necessary to look at the provocation.
The mind and the will of Wall had been prepared for insurbordination and revolt by his father and the priest. His refusal to obey
the commands of the school was deliberate. His offence became the
more agravated by reason of many others acting in concert with him,
to put down the authority of the school. The extent of the punishment was left as it were to his own choice. From the first blow
that fell upon his hands from the master's rattan, to the last that
was given, it was in his power to make every one the last.
He was punished for insurbordination, and a determination to
stand out against the lawful commands of the school. Every blow
given was for a continued resistance and a new offence. The offence
and the punishment went hand in hand together. The punishment
ceased when the offence ceased.
By this the court is not to be understood as justifying the inflicting of punishment upon a scholar so long as he holds out against the
commands of the school. The punishment must not be extended
beyond the limits of sound discretion, and this every master must
decide at his peril. In this case the punishment inflicted, when
compared with the offence committed, and all the attendant circumstances as they appeared upon the trial, was neither excessive,
nor inflicted through malice by the defendant.
The defendant is discharged.

THORNTON CHECK vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

In the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
THORNTON CHECK VS. THE LITTLE MIAMI RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. Where a party contracts for transportation over a route composed of several railroads, for which he pays an entire sum, and receives a through ticket or receipt,
the contract is entire, and not of several distinct liabilities.

If no partnership in

fact exist between the roads, he may treat the contract as entire, or several, so
far as the other parties are concerned.
2. By the appointment of a common agent to receive the entire consideration, and
issue through tickets and cheeks, which they recognize and assume, the several
companies are made aware that the contract is treated by the passengers as entire,
and not several.
3. If the agent at the starting point fails to disclose his principals, and to contract
on their behalf, whether jointly or severally, he, or the company represented by
him, may be treated as sole principal; but if the contract be, in fact, entire, and
he is, in fact, dealing for others who receive the benefits of the contract, the
other contracting party may look to the real principals, and subject all who are
interested in the joint contract.
4. The delivery of a check to a passenger is intended to relieve him of any care or
superintendence of his baggage, while on its journey, and devolves such care
upon the agents of the several roads over which it passes.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts are fully stated,
was delivered by
SPENCER, J.-The petition in this case sets forth that the defendant entered into a contract of partnership with the Columbus and
Xenia Railroad Company, the Central Ohio Railroad Company, the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and the Washington Branch
Railroad Company, by which they formed a running connection
over their respective roads, for the transportation of passengers,
with their baggage, from Washington city to the city of Cincinnati,
for reward, and that during said partnership, viz, on the 29th of
December, 1856, the defendant, at Washington city, by its agent,
contracted with the plaintiff, for the consideration of $16, then paid
by plaintiff to said agent, to transport the plaintiff and baggage
safely, and in a reasonable time, to the city of Cincinnati, over said
several roads, by virtue of which contract the plaintiff took passage
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on the cars of the Washington Branch Road, at Washington city,
and delivered to the proper agent of said Washington Branch Road,
his baggage, consisting of a large trunk, containing his wearing
apparel, of the value of $203 75, and $95 in money, being for
necessary traveling expenses ; that said agent gave to plaintiff a
through check for his baggage from Washington city to Cincinnati;
that plaintiff was, in a reasonable time, safely carried over the entire
distance, and, upon his arrival in Cincinnati, demanded his baggage
from defendants; that said baggage was not delivered to him, nor
safely carried over said roads, but, on the contrary, a portion thereof,
consisting of said sum of money, and wearing apperal, to the value
of $150 75, (in all $246 75,) was wholly lost, through the carelessness and negligence of the defendants, and were never delivered to
the plaintiff, and the residue thereof, though delivered by the
defendant to the plaintiff, was delayed unreasonably, for the space
of fourteen days, by reason of which delay he has sustained damage
in the sum of $150, and for which, together with the value of the
property lost, he claims damages, amounting, in all, to $396 75.
For answer the defendant comes and denies the existence of any
contract of partnership between defendant and said other railroad
companies, as averred in said petition; and denies that said trunk
was delivered to said defendant, or to any agent of theirs authorized
to contract in their behalf, as alleged in the petition.
On the trial, the plaintiff offered in evidence his own deposition,
from which it appears that on the day named in the petition, the
plaintiff engaged passage at the ticket office of the Washington
Branch Railroad, in Washington city, from thence to Cincinnati,
over the several roads named in the petition, paid a clerk in the
office $16, for the entire passage money, and received a throughi
ticket for his own passage, and a check for his baggage, for the
entire route, of which a duplicate was placed on his trunk ; that he
placed the trunk, thus checked, in the hands of the baggage mnstef
for the line, at Washington ; that it was properly fastened, and contained the articles specified in the petition; that upon the same day
the plaintiff started upon the cars at Washington, and reached Cincinnati on the second day following; that his ticket and check were
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recognized by the several agents of the roads over which he traveled,
including that of defendants, as entitling him to pass over. That
on his arrival in Cincinnati he demanded his trunk at defendant's
depot; that the same could not be found: that at the end of fourteen
days it was found at defendant's depot. That when thus found it
was recognized by defendant's agent, as plaintiff's, by the countercheck in plaintiff's possession. That the trunk had been broken
open, and the property claimed by the plaintiff to be lost, had been
taken out of it. That the agent of the defendants acknowledged
the trunk had been broken open, but stated that such was its condition when it arrived at the depot. That plaintiff at first refused
to receive what remained of his propdrty, unless remuneration was
made him for his damage; but finally took it. That the amount of
the property lost was as stated in the petition, and that by reason
of being obliged to wait for his baggage, plaintiff was unable to proceed immediately upon his journey, and lost thereby opportunity
for employment, for the space of six weeks, upon the steamer Hickman, on which he had been engaged in his regular business, at 540
per month, and for which he claims to have sustained special damage,
to the amount of $150.
This was all the testimony offered in the case. The plaintiff
claims to recover, upon either of two grounds:
1st. That whatever relation the defendant might have sustained
to the Washington Branch, and intermediate railroads, inter se, yet
as to the world, they held themselves out as partners, and the plaintiff has therefore a right to charge them as such, and to hold each
liable for the acts of either or all.
2d. That independent of partnership, the trunk being found in
possession of defendant in a mutilated condition, throws upon them
the burthen of showing that the loss did not happen whilst the trunk
was in their possession as carriers.
The facts relied upon as going to show a partnership, are: the
emplo'yment of a common agent at Washington city, to receive
through fare for the entire route, and for each of the roads; the
receipt of such fare and the delivery of a single ticket, and a single
chece for the entire route; and the acknowledgment of the suffi-
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ciency of such ticket and check, by the several agents of all the
companies throughout the route, and to the end of the journey.
How far these facts, in conjunction with the known customs and
usages of railroads, are to be regarded as holding out to the world,
an idea of special or limited partnership as between such roads and
persons dealing with them, has been to me a question of no little
embarrassment; and especially so, as the number of authorities
upon the subject are exceedingly limited, and of a contradictory
character.
In the case of -Ellsworthvs. Tartt, 26 Ala. 733, the defendants
owned a line of stages, or a continuous and connected passenger
line, from Montgomery, in Alabama, to Charleston, in South Carolina, connect with another line of stages at one end, and with a railroad at the other. The plaintiff took passage from Montgomery to
Charleston; paid his fare for the entire distance, and received a
through ticket, at Montgomery. He passed, with his baggage,
safely over the railroad, and over defendant's line, and whilst upon
the connecting line of stages, owned by other parties, discovered his
trunk was missing. The defendant acknowledged himself proprietor
ofhis own line, took a memorandum of the lost articles, and promised
to assist in finding them. The money received for passage was to
be paid over to the different lines, in certain agreed amounts.
Upon the trial below, the judge charged the jury that if the passage
money was paid over to a common agent, and was to be shared by all
the parties, they were liable to the world as partners, and the defendant, as one of the firm, amenable to the plaintiff's action. It was held
on error that the charge was erroneous, "that although the plaintiff had
purchased a through ticket, and defendant was to receive part of the
price paid for it, under a contract for that purpose with the other
parties, as to his po.tion of the route, that did not render him liable
as a partner, so as to subject him to a loss not occurring upon his
portion of the route. The court say, (page 736,) ' The liability of
the defendant as a partner, was made to depend solely upon the
fact of his having the right to receive a portion of the money paid
for the through ticket. Suppose the different proprietors along the
route came to the understanding to appoint a common agent at each
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end, to receive the fare of each, from passengers going through, and
to give a receipt or through ticket, it is very clear that such an
agreement would not constitute a partnership inter se, or as to
third persons, and yet each proprietor would have the right to
receive his proportion of the fare ; there would be in such case no
community of interest, either in the property or the profits.' "
This decision was undoubtedly correct, in so far as it reversed the..
decision of the court below. The court below had held it conclusive
proof of a partnership, that the defendant had received a portion of
the money paid for a through ticket, without considering the question of a community of profits, or of joint interest in the property,
or a joint undertaking to carry. But so far as the court of errors
undertook to negative the idea of partnership, on the ground that there
appeared to be no community of interest between the parties, either in
the property or in the profits it seems to me the court went entirely.
too far. A continuous line, and the undertaking of each to forward
passengers, who had been carried over the route of another, might
have made the routes of all more profitable, by inducing increased
travel, and thus give such an interest in the purpose of the undertaking of all.
In the case of Hart vs. The Rensselaer and SaratogaRailroad
Co., 4 Selden 37, the plaintiff purchased, at Whitehall, from an
agent, through passenger tickets from thence to Troy. Part of
the line was covered by the defendant's road, part by the road of
another company, and part by the Washington and Saratoga Railroad,
and put his baggage, consisting of four trunks, on board the cars
at Whitehall. Both passenger and baggage cars run all the way
through. Two of the trunks arrived safely at Troy, the other two
were lost. Such was the plaintiff's proof, and on motion for a nonsuit, the court below refused it. The defendant then offered evidence that there was an agreement between the three companies,
by which the defendant run its engine between Troy and Saratoga;
and the Saratoga and Washington Railroad Company, its engine
between Saratoga and Whitehall. That each run cars over the
whole distance, accounting to the three for their proper proportion
of the distance run. That for the accommodation of passengers,
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tickets were sold in three parts, Troy to Balston, Balston to Saratoga, Saratoga to Whitehall. The court charged the jury, "that
it was not a question whether the baggage was received on the
defendant's road, but by the defendant's agents at Whitehall or elsewhere," upon which plaintiff obtained a verdict. On a writ of error,
complaint was made, that the court below refused to nonsuit the
plaintiff, as requested, and that the charge of the court below was
erroneous. The court above intimate that when the plaintiff closed
his case, the evidence of the defendant's liability was slight, hardly
sufficient to warrant a verdict. But this point it was unnecessary
to decide; for upon the further evidence given by defendant, the
verdict was clearly right, and no fault was to be found with the
charge; for it appeared further, in evidence by a witness, that he
was baggage man in the employment of defendant, had charge of
the baggage car from Whitehall to Troy, which belonged to the
defendant, and in which part of the defendant's baggage was carried
from Whitehall to Troy; that he once went into the other baggage
cars which the agents of the Whitehall road had filled up with emigrants' baggage, (to which class plaintiff belonged:) that on his
arrival at Saratoga he neglected assorting the baggage to be sent
to Schenectady from that to be sent to Troy, out of the freight car
which came to Troy; and that through tickets were sometimes sold
to emigrants.
The ground upon which this decision rests is not distinctly stated
by the court, whether because the evidence showed a joint interest
between the several roads,<as partners; or whether it showed that
the trunks were from the beginning considered as under the charge
of the defendant's agent.
In a manuscript case, decided at general term of the Supreme
Court of Buffalo, Morris vs. The Jichigan Southern Railroad Co.,
the case of Hart vs. Te Bensselaer and SaratogaRailrood Co. was
held as conclusively deciding that payment to a common agent of
the passenger money for the entire line, accompanied by a through
ticket, constituted the several companies of which the line was composed, partners as between themselves and the parties making such
payment. In this case the defendant was the connecting link
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between The Northern Indiana Railroad, and the Erie and Kalamazoo Railroad, the three forming a continuous line from Chicago
to Toledo. They had agents at each end of the line, who received
through fare and gave tickets and bills accordingly, and the money
was divided among the roads according to the distance traveled
by each. The plaintiff put his cattle on board the cars at Chicago,
destined for Toledo, which were damaged before they reached
defendant's road. He also put some hogs on the cars at Chicago,
for Toledo, which were damaged after they left the defendant's road.
For the latter there was no way bill, or memorandum of transportation, nor any special contract other than what was implied from
payment of the price of transportation for the whole distance. For
the cattle there was a way-bill, signed by the transportation agent
at Chicago, as follows:
,,Northern Indiana R. R. Co., Jan. 7, 1853.
Way-bill of Merchandise forwarded from Chicago to Toledo.
N'o. of Car.

603, 141, 134, 127,
129, 140, &c.

To whom consigned.
Jno. Morris,
Toledo.

Description.
123 head of cattle 11
Cars, @ $25

Charges.
$287 50

L. DARLING, Agent,
per D. W. Matthews."

These facts the court held, under the decision of the case alluded
to, were sufficient to establish a joint liability on the part of defendants, with the other railroads, as partners. It is true the court also
held that such contract of partnership was not within the scope of
the defendants authority, under their charter, and was therefore
void.
Upon this latter question, however, I need not dwell, since we
have decided in General Term, in two cases, that a railroad company might make a binding contract of transportation beyond its
own terminus.
The real question to be determined in this, and cases of a like kind,
is, with whom has the plaintiff made his contract ? When a party
contracts with an agent for transportation over an entire line, for
which he pays an entire price, and receives one through receipt,
does he understand that he is making payment for art entire con28
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sideration, or for several distinct considerations to be received ? and
do the parties with whom he deals hold themselves out as dealing
severally, or as uniting in a common purpose for an entire consideration! The answer to these questions, it seems to me, must determine the question of liability. Now, it is evident, that so far as the
plaintiff is concerned, he must have considered the contract of transportation as entire, either as made with the company at the starting
point of the line, or as made with all the parties composing the line,
he considered the contract as a unit, and not made up of several
distinct agreements with several distinct parties. The evidence
which he receives from the other contracting party is of an entire
engagement, and not of several distinct liabilities; the price he pays
is an entire sum, and he makes no inquiry into the consideration to
be received by each company individually; his baggage is checked
through the entire distance, to be delivered in safety at his journey's
end, and is not to be delivered to or inquired for by him at any
intermediate point. If his ticket should be refused at any intermediate point, he does not expect to return back the consideration
being received for that particular part of the route. He considers
the whole contract broken, and that he is entitled to a return of the
price for the whole journey unperformed, and in this case he does
not expect to call upon each company severally for its proportion of
the consideration received, for that corporation he does not know,
he expects to be reimbursed in an entire sum. It follows then that
so far as he is concerned, he treats the contract as entire, and not
merely several. If no partnership in fact exists between the roads,
he may, undoubtedly, treat the contract as entire, or several, so far
as the other parties are concerned.
By the appointment of a common agent, to receive the entire
consideration, who issues through tickets and checks, which they-ecognize, and assume, they are made aware of the expectations of parties
dealing with the agent, and must therefore know the contract is
treated as entiie, and not several. With whom, then, if entire, is
the contract made ? Undoubtedly, if the agent of the company at
the starting point fails to disclose his principals, and to contract on
their behalf. wbpther jointly or severally, he, or the company repre-
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sented by him, may be treated as sole principal, and held liable
accordingly. But if the contract made by him be entire, and he is,
in fact, dealing for others who receive the benefits of the contract,
the other contracting party may look to the real principals, and
subject all who are interested in the joint contract. In this view of
the case, I am of opinion that this contract of transportation may
be properly considered as joint between all the roads participating
in its benefits, and that the defendants are liable accordingly; an
opinion in all respects confirmed by Judge Redfield, in his Treatise
on Railways.
Assuming, however, that the facts above referred to, fail to
establish a joint liability between the several parties forming the
line, and still it seems to me the case is in favor of the plaintiff.
It is in proof that the trunk containing the plaintiff's baggage,
was delivered in good order upon the cars at Washington city, with
a through check fastened upon it ; that the check was recognized
by the defendant as authorizing them to carry the trunk through,
and deliver it to plaintiff; that the trunk came into the hands of
defendant, and was transported over its line of road; that when it
reached the end of the line it had been broken open, and in part
rifled of its contents. The delivery of the check to the plaintiff was
intended to relieve him from any care or superintendence of the
trunk while on its journey, and devolved such care upon the agents
of the several roads over which it passed. It is found in the defendants hands broken open and rifled. The defendants give no account
of the condition in which it was received by them, though they
acknowledge it was apparent the trunk had been broken open.
The nature of the case renders it difficult, if not impossible, on the
part of the plaintiff, to show where the loss did happen, whether
before or after the trunk came into defendant's possession. In this
state of the case, it seems to me, that the burthen of proof ought
to rest with the defendants, and that we are justified in holding,
that as the trunk started on its journey in a souna condition, it so
continued, until it was found to be injured, and that the party in
whose possession it was first found to be injured should render
account for such injury, or show that it happened elsewhere; and
in default of such account should answer for the lo.s-
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I have examined the matters in controversy at considerable length,
because they present important practical questions, and when persons are traveling over long routes, composed of several different
companies, acting in concert, they ought to be made to understand
with whom they are contracting and to whom they are to look for
remuneration in case of loss.
As to the amount of recovery, the quantity and value of plaintiff's
wearing apparel, with which he was traveling, was not unreasonable
in amount, nor of money taken by him for reasonable traveling
expenses. But as to the charge occasioned by not receiving his
baggage in due season, it is not the subject of remuneration. It is
not set forth specially in the petition, nor was it the necessary or
direct result of the failure to deliver the plaintiff's trunk.
I shall therefore cause judgment to be entered up for plaintiff,
for the value of the wearing apparel and money lost, amounting to
:$246 75, with interest from the time of suit brought.
TV. B. Probasco, for *plaintiff.
Curwen and Wright, for defendant.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, -December 1858.
RUFUS ALLEN ET AL., LIBELLANTS AND APPELLANTS vs. HENRY L. NEWBERRY, CLAIMANT OF THE STEAMBOAT " FASHION," ETC.
1.' Under the act of Congress of 26th February, 1845, prescribing and regulating
the jurisdiction of the federal courts in admiralty upon the lakes, a libel cannot
be sustained on a bill of lading for the carriage of goods between two ports of the
same State, though in a general ship whose principal voyage is between ports
of different States, WAYsp, GnIEn, and CATIION, JJ. dizs.

2. Whether the federal courts might not have jurisdiction in such a case, however,
where it becomes necessary to adjust the questions of general average and coniribution, lue.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This is an appeal in admiralty from a decree of the
District Court for the District of Wisconsin.
The libel states that the goods in question were shipped on board
the Fashion at the port of Two Rivers, in the State of Wisconsin, to
be delivered at the port of Milwaukee, in the same State, and that
the master, by reason of negligence and the unskillful navigation of
the vessel, and of her unseaworthiness, lost them in the course of
the voyage.
The respondent sets up, in the answer, the seaworthiness of the
vessel, and that the goods were jettisoned in a storm upon the lake.
The evidence taken in the court below was directed principally
to these two grounds of defence ; but in the view the court has taken
of the case, it will not be important to notice it.
The act of Congress of 26th February, 1845, prescribing and
regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts in admiralty upon
the lakes, and which was held by this court in the case of the
Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, to be valid and binding, confines that
jurisdiction to " matters of contract and tort, arising in, upon, or
* * * " employed
concerning steamboats and other vessels,"
in business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in
different States and Territories upon the lakes, and navigable waters
connecting said lakes, &c."
This restriction of the jurisdiction to business carried on between
ports and places in different States, was doubtless suggested by the
limitation in the constitution, of the power in Congress to regulate
commerce. The words are: "Congress shall have power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." In the case of Gibbon vs. Ogden, 9 Wh.
194, it was held that this power did not extend to the purely internal
commerce of a State. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the
opinion of the court in that case, observed: "It is not intended to
say that these words comprehend that commerce which is completely
internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State or
between parts of the same State and which does not extend to or
NELSON,
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affect other States." Again, he observes: " The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied
to all tbe external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally, but not to those which are
completly within a particular State when they do not affect other
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose
of executing some of the general powers of the government. The
completely internal commerce of a State then. he observes, may be
considered as reserved for the State itself." Ib.195.
This distinction in te act of 1845 is noticed by the present Chief
Justice in delivering the opinion in the Genesee Chief. He observed:
" The act of 1814 extends only to such vessels when they are engaged
in commerce between the States and Territories. It does not apply
to vessels engaged in the domestic commerce of a State."
This restriction of the admiralty jurisdiction was asserted in the
case of the New Jersey Steam Eavigatiou Company vs. The Merehahts Bank, 6 How. 892, the first case in which the jurisdiction
was upheld by this court upon a contract of affreightment. It
was there remarked, that " the exclusive jurisdiction of the court
in admiralty cases was conferred on the national government, as
closely connected with the grant of the commercial power. It is a
maritime court, instituted for the purpose of administering the law
of the seas. There seems to be ground, therefore, for restraining
its jurisdiction in some measure within the limit of the grant of the
commercial power, which would confine it, in cases of contract, to
those concerning the navigation and trade of the country upon the
high seas, &c., with foreign countries and among the several States.
Contracts growing out of the purely internal commerce of the
State &c., are generally domestic in their origin and operation, and
could scarcely have been intended to be drawn within the cognizance
of the federal courts."
The contract of shipment in this case was for the transportation
of the goods from the port of Two Rivers to the port of Milwaukee,
both in the State of Wisconsin; and upon the principles above
stated, the objection to the jurisdiction of the court below would be
quite clear, were it not for the circumstance that the vessel at the
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time of this shipment was engaged in a voyage to Chicago, a port
in another State. She was a general ship, with an assorted cargo,
engaged in a general carrying business between ports of different
States; and there is some ground for saying, upon the words of the
act of 1845, that the contracts over which the jurisdiction is conferred, are contracts of shipment with a vessel engaged in the business of commerce between the ports of different States. But the
court is of opinion that this is not the true construction and import
of the act. On the contrary, that the contracts mentioned relate to
the goods carried as well as to the vessel, and that the shipment
must be made between ports of different States.
This view of the act harmonizes with the limitation of the jurisdiction as expressed, independently of any act of Congress, in the
case of New Jersey Aeam, Navigation Company vs. The Merehants
Bank, before referred to.
We confine our opinion upon the question of jurisdiction to the
case before us, namely, to the suit upon the contract of shipment of
goods between ports and places of the same State.
The court is of opinion that the district court had no jurisdiction
over it in admiralty, and that the jurisdiction belonged to the
courts of the State.
It may be, that in respect to a vessel like the present, having
cargo on board to be carried between ports of the same State as well
as between ports of different States, in cases of sale or bottomry of
a cargo for relief of the vessel in distress, of voluntary stranding of
the ship, jettison, and the like, where contribution and general
average arise, that the federal courts shall be obliged to deal incidentally with the subject, the question being influenced by the common peril in which all parties in interest are concerned, and to
which ship, freight, and cargo, as the case may be, are liable to contribute their share of the loss.
A small part of the goods in question in this case were shipped
for the port of Chicago, but are not of sufficient value to warrant an
appeal to this court.
The decree of the court below, dismissing the libel, affirmed.
DISSEINTIETIBUS-Wayne, Grier, Catron.

